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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by the Plaintiff-Appellant corporation 
through its president to protect and preserve corporate assets. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Lower Court held that the president of the corporation 
was not entitled to bring this action on behalf of the corporation 
and dismissed the case without a hearing on the merits. 
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RELIEF S.OUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Appellant seeks reversal of the lower Courts 
judgment of dismissal and a remand of this matter to the 
lower Court for ajudication on the merits. 
~EMENT OF FACTS 
The Plaintiff-Appellant corporation is owned equally 
by four sisters, one of whom is the Defendant Deloris P. Darius. 
(R. 18). Currently, the four sisters are deadlocked in groups 
of two as to whether or not a corporate resolution authorizing 
the Defendant Deloris P. Darius, Secretary of the Corporation, 
and her husband, the Defendant Dale M. Darius, to purchase 
property purchased jointly by the Plaintiff-Appellant corporation 
and the Defendants should be passed. (R. 63}. Reconciliation of 
the two groups of sisters on this matter did not, and does 
not now, appear imminent. (R. 63}. The title to the property, 
though purchased jointly, continues to be held by the Defendants-
Respondents in spite of the Plaintiff-Appellant corporation's 
repeated request to have the Defendant-Respondents deliver 
it over. (R. 63) • 
In view of the deadlock between the four members of the 
board of directors as to the sale of the property and the fact 
that the title to the property is still ,in the possession 
of the Defendants-Respondents, the president of the corporation, 
Jean P. Hull instituted this action on behalf of the corporation 
to presei:ve and protect its interest in the above-mentioned 
propertyo Defendants-Respondents responded to this suit by 
-s-
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moving the lower Court to dismiss this action on grounds, inter 
alia, that the president was not empowered to bring this suit 
in behalf of the corporation. The Court below, despite Utah 
case law directly to the contrary, allowed the pefendants-
Respondents' Motion to Dismiss holding that the president of 
the corporation was not authorized to bring this action. It 
is from the lower Courts ruling and judgment on this Motion that 
the Plaintiff-Appellant appeals. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE LOWER COURT'S FAILURE TO FOLLOW KAMAS SECURITIES CO. 
VS. TAYLOR, 226 P.2d 111 (Utah 1950) RESULTS IN ERROR 
AT LAW REQUIRING REVERSAL OF THE JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL 
ENTERED BELOW. 
The holding of Kamas Securities Co. vs. Taylor, 226 P~2d 
111 (Utah 1950) is applicable to the present case and controlling 
on these facts. 
In the Kamas s·ecurities case the Plaintiff corporation, 
through its president, sued its secretary for delivering to 
unauthorized individuals collateral which the corporation held 
on a note due it. One of the grounds that the Defendant raised 
to defend the claim was that the president was not capable of 
bringing the action without a resolution from the Board of 
Directors. The Court rejected that argument. It stated: 
"It is true.that there was no resolution of the Board 
of Directors directing such suit to be filed, but an 
exe·cutive officer is not required to· wait for formal 
resolution of the directors to perform his offical 
duties to preserve the assets of the corporation or to 
prevent" their disipation. 11 226 P. 2d at 115 {emphasis 
added) • 
-6-
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Thus, in a corporate setting where a loss of corporate assets 
is at stake, it is not only oroper for the president to take 
legal action to preserve the assets, it is one of his "official 
duties." This is precisely what has occurred in Llovdona. 
The pertinent minutes of the corporate meetings all show 
that there is a clear dispute as to the sale arrangement of the 
property which was jointly purchased by the Plaintiff-Appellant 
and the Defendants-Respondents. The October 17, 1978 minutes, 
upon which Defendants-Respondents have relied to show that 
a sale was consumated (R.35}, do state that a sale to the 
Defendants-Respondents is contemplated. They also state clearly 
and explicitly that the sale is still contingent upon an agreement 
as to the price. The whole-of the minutes of that meeting that 
pertain to the matter in question, as reproduced below, clearly 
show this state of facts. 
" The law office will be paid for in November 1978. The 
original purchase price was $19,000.00. Lloydona paid 
$2,500.00 down on it as did Deloris and Dale. Deloris 
also paid $500.00 for closing costs from her personal 
money. The Darius• to buv Lloydona's Portion of the 
law office. Dale has arranged £or a current and inde-
pendant appriasal through Miller Realty in Brigham and 
Jean will arrange for an appriasal through Realtor in 
Ogden. Monthly payment for the office has been $240.35. 
The papers concerning the financial agreements be~Neen 
Lloydona and the r:orius 's are in escrow until final payment. 
Stockholders will receive a copy of the agreement when 
the final payment has been made and the Darius's have 
received the papers from escrow. The building was 
purchased in December 1971. After the appraisals have 
been comPleted Jean, Ga~ and Deloris will meet witn 
Dale and decide on a Price. The will then contact 
Jo and· confer with. inal decision is made." 
R. 3 
-7-
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Th.e Def.endants-Responden ts also relied on the minutes 
from the corporations annual meeting of January 30, 1979 to 
claim there was a clear corporate resolution consummating the 
sale. (R. 35). Again, a reading of the minutes, rather than 
showing the acceptance of a corporate resolution, demonstrates 
with clarity the deadlock pitting two sisters against two 
sisters. The whole of these minutes, with pertinent points 
underlined, states: 
" Office Building - Jean and Joy requested that the copies 
of the original contract to purchase the office building be 
clarified and given to members of Lloydona. A lengthy 
discussion ensued. Th.ere was a lengthy discussion as 
to the recent appraisals obtained for the building, 
especially by Bruce Christensen. Gay proposed that unless 
there is- a majority vote against, that we accept the 
~14 ,oa·o ~ 0·9: offer ma~e bS 9a17 Dori us· to purchase Lloydona' s 
interes·-c in the of·fi.·ce ui1ding. · It was· seconded b 
Deloris. Two or, two a~inst. De oris clari ie that 
it was not the intent of the parties involved in the 
purchase of the building to sell the office building to 
a third p!trty .--- .-· All ~ere in agreement to th.is. 
Jean proposed that a clarification of the paper work 
from escrow be made and Joy seconded this proposal. 'I'Wo 
for, two abstension. Gay moved that the Christensen 
appraisal be accepted as a valid appraisal and Deloris 
seconded it. It was thereafter agreed that is was a 
valid appraisal by all present." (R. 42} {emphasis added} • 
As the minutes state, two were "for" and two were ''against" 
the proposal to sell the property. The deadlock is clear. 
Defendants-Respondents have also sought to rely upon the 
last two sentences of the above q-Uote . .:.minutes stating that 
there was a unanimous vote as to the validity of the appraisal, 
to show that there was an agreement to sell on those terms. 
The minutes speak for themselves. The proposal was that 
-a-
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" the Christensen appraisal be accepted as, a valid appraisal." 
(R. 42). Thus, there was no agreement and approval as to the 
~of the property, only to the validity of the appraisal. 
The decision to sell, was deadlocked in sets of two. 
Further evidence that there was a deadlock between the 
groups of sisters comes from the corporate minutes of November 
5, 1979. (R. 63). At that meeting the previously quoted 
January 1979 minutes were amended and approved as amended. The 
amendments clearly reflect the split of two deadlocked groups 
of sisters. 
" Paragraph 5 - Office Building Jean stated that Gay's 
Motion was not a fair Motion. Jov and Jean etated that 
$14 ,000. 00 is not acceptable and they feel the trans-
action is not complete or settled. Joy and Jean feel 
that Lloydona should continue to pay on the office 
expenses • ·Gay and Deloris agree that the $14, 000. 00 
should' and has been accepted for the office bui.ldinq 
and feel of the transaction has be-en and l.S· concluded. 
Jean stated that she called all of us regarding the original 
purchase of the office building and Gay does not recall 
being contacted as she was in Peru at the time. No one 
went through the steps of overseeing the original paper 
work and signing the same on behalf of the corporation." 
(R. 6 3) (emphasis added) • 
Thus, the facts in the present case, as demonstrated by th.e 
pertinent corporate minutes, are that two groups of sisters 
are deadlocked as to whether corporate property should be 
so.ld or retained. The result of the deadlock h.as been the inability 
of the corporation to act while the title to the corporation's 
interest in the aforementioned property remains in the possession 
of the Defendants-Respondents, a fact which these Defendants-
Respondents neither dispute nor deny. In the face of this 
-9-
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corporate inability to act the corporate president has filed 
this suit to compel the return of the corporation's one-half 
interest in the aforementioned property and thus preserve 
the corporation's assets. Such a fact situation is precisely 
what the ~scSecurities case was intended to cover. For 
failure to follow this precedent, the lower CourtJs Judgment 
of Dismissal should be reversed as a matter of law with a 
remand for a decision on the merits. 
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN THAT THE ARGUMENTS UPON WHICH 
IT COULD HAVE RELIED FOR ITS JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL WERE 
INSUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY DEPARTURE FROM THE KAMAS SECURITIES 
KOLDING. 
The substance of the Ruling of the lower Court in granting 
Defendants-Respondents' Motion to Dismiss states in toto: 
Based on the Pleadings, Memoranda, and Affidav~ts on file 
herein, I find that the control and management of the 
Plaintiff corporation is in the directors, and they alone 
may authorize the institution of litigation. That the 
president thereof does not have the implied power or 
the inherant power to institute this litigation in the 
name of the Plaintiff corporation. (R. 84} • 
As noted at the outset of the ruling the Court gave no independent 
rationale as to why the president did not have the authority to 
file this suit in the name of the corporation. Rather, the Court 
based its ruling "on the Pleadings, the Memoranda, and the 
Affidavits on file herein.•• (R. 84) • Thus, the arguments which 
.. 
the Defendants-~espondents raise to distinguish Kamas Securities 
take on additional importance; they become the rationale of the 
court. 
In the lower Court the Defendants-Respondents stated that 
-10-
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"the Kamas case can be differentiated on its facts from the 
Lloydona vs. Darius case" and gave three reasons for the 
differentiation: (1) the powers of the president in each case 
differed, (2) the irreparable loss present in Lloydona differed 
from that in Kamas· Se·curities, and (3) the nature of the 
business in Kamas Securities was different and was controlling. 
(R. 68}. None of these arguments is sufficient to distinguish 
the Kamas Securities from the case at hand. 
·A. THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE POWERS OF THE 
PRESIDENT IN KAMAS SECURITIES AND THOSE IN THE PRESENT 
CASE, WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY APPLYING DIFFERENT LAW. 
The first reason the Defendants-Respondents cited for 
distinguishing Kamas Securities was that in the Kamas Securities 
case the president was "t clothed with management of every 
department of the company.•" (R. 68). As the Plaintiff-Appellant 
pointed out in the lower Court (R. 73) , there was no finding 
in the Kamas Securities case that the president of Kamas Securities 
Co. was "clothed. • • with the management of evecy department." 
226 P.2d at 115. 
As. stated in the Kamas Securities case, th.is quote comes 
from the case of Greenbay Fish Co. vs. Jorgensen, 165 Wis. 
548, 163 N.W. 142, 144. £2.:_ at 115. It was apparently relied 
upon in Kamas Securities to support the principle from 2 
Fletcher Encylopedia of Corporations, Section 618, that "according 
to the more modern authorities, the president of the corporation 
has power to institute suits in its behalf." 226 P. 2d at 
-11-
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115 quoting 2 Fletch.~r eye. Corp. Section 618. Contrary 
to th.e Defendants-Respondents' assertion that the president 
in the Kamas· Securities case was "clothed with the management 
of every department," the Kamas Securities· decision relies 
on no such fact. Rather, the Court opinion in this aspect dwells 
upon the fact that the status of the corporation and the 
governing board was rather shaky. ("there was a controversy 
among the directors'' Id. at 115.} The focus in Kamas· Securities 
was on the ~, which was present for the president to 
bring the action, not upon t.l-ie specific powers of the 
president. The Court's reasoning reflects this. 
The Court in Kamas Securities did not attempt to show 
the president of Kamas Securities was "clothed. • • with the 
management of every department" and then conclude that the 
authority to instigate litigation was his. The Kamas. Securities 
court looked to the controversy in the corporation and determined 
that it was in the corporation's best interest that the president 
be allowed to file the suit. Any attempt to distinguish 
Kamas Securities. from the present action on grounds that the 
powers granted to the president differed in each case would 
appear to be very tenuous indeed. 
B. THE IRREPARABLE LOSS SUFFERED IN KAMAS· SECURITIES 
IS A UNIFYING, RATHER THEN A DISTINGUISHING POINT, BETWEEN 
KAMAS SECURITIES AND THE CASE AT HAND. 
The second reason presented to the lower Court upon which 
it could have relied to distinguish Kamas Securities was that 
"in Kamas the corporation would have suffered 'irreparable loss' 
in the Courts opinion if action would have been delayed." 
-12-
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(R. 68). The Defendanta-Respondents position h.ere apparently 
comes from the statement in. Kamas se:curities that " the president 
in this case was not required to obtain the consent of the. 
Board of Directo.rs, and had he deferred action until such 
consent had been procured th.e corporation might have suffered 
an irreparab.le loss." 226 P. 2d at 115 (emphasis addedl • 
An examination of the reasoning and facts beh.i.nd thi.s position 
in Kamas Securities demons.tra-tes that th.e irrep:arabl.e loss· 
in Kamas- Securities· was almost identical to that which the 
Plaintiff-Appellant claims he.re •. 
In Kamas, the Plaintiff corporation, thr.ough. ita president, 
sued the secre.ta.ry for the. unauthorized deli.very of co.llataral 
held on a note. of the. corporation. Th.e collateral for the note 
was de.livered by the Defendant to. h.is brothe..r., wh.o was liable 
on the note prior to the running of the statute. of l~tations. 
Because of the running of th.e. statute. of limitations 
on the note, the only means the Plaintiff corporation had 
to collect on the note was th.e. colJ.aterial which it had h.e.ld 
in its possession. -~·at 113. De.livery of th.e. collateral 
by the Defendant to his brother destroyed th.e righ.t which th.e 
corporation h.ad to the collateral and thus their abi,li ty to 
collect on the note. .!.£·· Accordingly, the. Plai.ntiff COXJ?oration · 
sued the secretary to make the. corporati.on whole as to the. ·. 
loss of the collateral for th.e. note. 
As the fore going facts. de:mons·trate, .the. aase.ts which the 
corporation was trying to preserve in Kamas: s-ecuri--ties, the. 
collateral for the loan, had already been lost. ·There would 
be no ''i.rreparabl.e loss," in teJ:ms ·of regaining the. colla.te.ral· 
-13....; 
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which wo.uld result from waiting for a board meeting which 
would authorize the president to sue. The collateral was already 
gone. 
Likewise, irreparable loss would not be incurred by 
waiting to sue the secretary of the corporation, as the Plaintiff 
corporation eventually did. The Court held that evidence 
showing the Defendant not to be a de jure officer would not effect 
the Plaintiffs right to recovery. Id. at 115. 
Additionally, although there are certainly elements in 
the Kamas Securities- showing that a dispute among members of 
the board existed, there was no finding by the Court in Kamas. 
that a deadlock, such as that which exists in the instant 
case was present in Kamas, making it likely that the suit would 
never be brought4and accordingly resulting in the loss of the 
corporate asset. 
In short, in Kamas Securities there was no pressing 
need, which could be equated with "irreparable loss" , 
that the corporate assets would be inuninently endangered if 
the action of the president was postponed until a subsequent 
board meeting. The holding of Court in Kamas Securities, as 
to irreparable loss, therefore appears to refer to the 
proposition that an "executive officer is not required to 
wait for fonnal. resolution'' if such waiting "might have" 
the result of the corporation losing its assets. Id. at 115. 
AS the record demonstrates and the foregoing arguments 
-14-
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affirm, the Plaintiff-Appellant corporation is in precisely 
this situation. Due to the split of the four directors on 
the board, there is no possibility of a majority vote to compel 
the Darius's to deliver title to the property for which 
Lloydona has paid. Thus, if the pr~sident of the corporation 
is not allowed to bring a suit at this time it is uncertain 
what will occur to Lloydona's interest in the property. 
Further, any argument that the loss is not irreparable 
as it could be redressed by a derivative action suit was also 
dealt with in Kamas Securities • There, this Court specifically 
stated that "regardless of any findings to the effect that the 
suit was by a stockholder on behalf of the stockholders, this 
action was properly in-d.tituted by the corporation at the instance 
of the president." ~ at 115. 
Thus, the second reason upon which the lower Court could 
have relied for distinguishing the Kamas Securities case 
from the one at hand provides very little substance for 
departure from that precedent. 
C. KAMAS: SECURITIES CANNOT BE DISTINGUISHED FROM THE 
PRESENT CASE ON THE BASIS OF THE NATURE OF THE BUSINESS 
INVOLVEDo 
The third possible reason offered for distinguishing 
Kamas. is that the nature of the business in Kamas was idealy 
suited to this type of presidental action. (R. 68}. 
Defendants-Respondents cite no aspect of the K'a:rnas s·ecurities 
case which makes reference to this contention. There is none. 
To. conclude, Plainti.f £-Appellant's first argument shows 
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that the Kamas· Securities case is aligned with the instant 
case on all major factual aspects. This argument demonstrates 
that the arguments of the Defendants-Respondents in the 
lower Court, upon which the Court must have relied, fail to 
distinguish Kamas Securities· from the action here. Kamas 
Securities is valid, undisturbed precedent from this 
Court. The Judgment from the Court below, is directly 
contrary to that precedent and should be reversed. 
III. THE AUTHORITIES UPON WHICH THE LOWER COURT COULD HAVE 
RELIED PROVIDE NO BASIS FOR THE OVERRULING OF THE KAMAS 
SECURITIES DECISION. 
In the lower Court the Defendants-Respondents attempted 
to establish that the law in Utah was other than that in the 
Kamas Securities by citing th.ree sources: (1) general statutory 
provisions from the-Utah Code, (2} encyclopedic references, and 
(3} a case from the state of New York. (R. 13-16). None 
of these sources gives sufficient reason to overrule the Kamas· 
Securities holding. 
A. THE GENERAL STATUTORY PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH CODE 
PERTAINING TO CORPORATE MANAGEMENT PROVIDE NO BASIS FOR 
OVERRULING THE K.1\.MAS SECURITIES DECISION. 
The Defendants-Respondents cited the Utah Code Annotated 
Sections 16-10-33 and 16-10-45. (R. 13,14}. These provisions 
state generally that the Board of Directors should manage 
the corporation and that the corporate of£icers should obtain 
their authority from the by-laws and resolutions of the board. 
The Plaintiff-Appellant does not dispute these general statements 
of corporate procedure nor does the Kamas Securities case argue 
against them. Kamas Securities· merely provides the rule for 
-16-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
those unique fact situations where corporate assets are 
imperiled and action by the president is necessary to 
preserve them. The statutes in no way give grounds to over-
turn this Court's prior holding in Kamas securi tie·s. 
B. THE ENCYCLOPEDIC REFERENCES PRESENTED TO THE COURT 
BELOW PROVIDE AN INSUFFICIENT BASIS FOR OVERTURNING 
PRECEDENT FROM THIS COURT. 
The Defendants-Respondents offered the lower Court 
numerous quotations from encyclopedic references to present 
its argument that the law in Utah. is different from the law 
as stated by this Court in Kamas· Securities.. (R. 14-16}. 
Each of these encyclopedic references falls within one of 
three catagories which do not provide appropriate authority 
for the lower Court to depart from this Court~s precedent. 
First let it simply be stated that th.ere is a split in 
the jurisidictions as to the power of the president to bring 
an action in behalf of the corporation in situations such 
as these. 2 Fletcher O:fc. Corp., Section 618. The quotati.ons 
rendered by the Defendants-Respondents in the Court below 
reflect this. For exampl.e, Defendants.-Respondents references 
read "it has been held" 19 Am. Jur. 2d Section 1157, "the 
strict rule layed down by ~authorities" 19 Am. Jur. 2d 
Section 1169, "there !!._ authority to the effect that'·' 19 
Am. Jur. 2d Section 1190. (R. 15, 16) • 
Plaintiff does not dispute the existence of contrary 
authority in other jurisdications·. It does dispute, however, 
th.at they constitute sufficient grounds for the lower Court 
t<) overturn the rule of law set forth by this Court in Kamas. 
Se cu.ri ties ... 
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To the extent that the encyclopedic references are not 
based upon authorities from other jurisidictions where the 
rule is different than that in Kamas· Securities, they reflect 
(1) general statements of corporate law which the Plaintiff-
Appellant does not dispute (19 Am. Jur. 2d Section 1156, 
19 Am. Jur. 2d Section 1119) or (2) specific statements of 
situations which do not fit the facts at hand (''after· refusal 
of a majority of the Board of Directors" 120 A.L.R. 2d Secti.on 
120) (there is a split on the board in Lloydona, not a refus·al 
by majority.) (R. 14,15}. 
Thus, to the extent that the encyclopedic references reflect 
the law of the jurisdictions and general corporate principles, 
the Plaintiff-Appellant acknowledges their accuracy. Inso-
far as the authorities have been relied upon by the lower Court 
to depart from the specific holding of Utah case law, the 
Plaintiff-Appellant contends that such reliance is unjustified 
and error at law. 
C. THE NEW YORK CASE OF STERLING INDUS·TRIES· VS. BALL BEARING 
PEN CORP., 298 N.Y. 483, 84 N.E. 2d 790 (1949} IS AN IN-
ADEQUATE SOURCE FOR REVERSAL OF KAMAS SECURITIES CO. VS. 
TAYLOR, 226 P.2d lll (Utah. 1950}. 
The final authority presented to the lower Court was 
Sterling Indus·tries vs .• Ball Bearing Pen Corp., 298 N. Y. 483, 
84 N.E. 2d 790 (1949). Any reliance upon this authority to 
overturn Kamas S~rities would be inadequate for a number 
of reasons. 
First, as mentioned above, authority does exist in other 
jurisdictions for a rule different than that in Kamas Securities. 
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The New York case is one of those precedents. However, the 
mere existence of contrary authority should not result in 
a departure from Utah case law. No adequate policy reasons 
have been given for this departure. 
Second, the facts in the Sterling Industries are significantly 
different from those in the case at hand. The Sterling Industries 
case did present a situation similar to Lloydona in that there 
were two sets of directors deadlocked as to what action to 
take. However, as the Plaintiff-Appellant pointed out in the 
Court below, there were specific corporate by-laws in the Sterling 
Industries case which covered the situation. The New York Court 
~erely held that the by-laws were controlling and that an action 
by the president would not be allowed. In the instant action 
there are no applicable by-laws. Thus, on its facts, the 
Sterlina Industries is easily distinguished from Lloydona. 
Finally, it is interesting to note th.at by subsequent 
case law t.11.e New York Court of Appeals has greatly restricted 
its holding in Sterling Industries· and given the corporate 
president the right to instigate litigation i~ situations similar 
to the one at hand. Rothman & Schnieder, Inc. vs. Beckerman 
141 N.E. 2d 610, 613 (N.Y. 1957) ("when directors deadlock 
over corporate litigation and the president hires an attorney 
to sue or defend for the corporation he may proceed and recover 
compensation for his work.") (citations omitted); Westview 
Hills, Inc. vs. Lizau Realty Corp., 160 N.E. 2d 622, 624 
(N. Y. 195 9) ("absent the provisions in the by-laws or action 
by the Board of Directors prohibiting the De£endant from 
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defending and insti:tuting aui.t i.n the name of and in behalf 
of the corporation, he must be deemed in the discharge of his 
duties, to have presumptive authority to so act."} 
Plaintiff-Appellant therefore contends that case law 
from a New York Court, which has been restricted in its own 
jurisdiction and whose facts present signi£icant differences from 
the case at hand, should not be authority to overturn 
applicable case law from this Court. 
To conclude, none of the three authorities upon which 
the lower Court could have relied provide sufficient grounds 
to overturn this Courts prior holding in the Kamas S·ecuri ties 
case. 
IV. CASE LAW FROM OTHER JURISDICITIONS REINFORCES THE LAW 
IN THIS JURISDICTION THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS THE AUTHORITY 
TO SUE IN BEHALF OF THE CORPORATION. 
As stated earlier, the jurisdictions are split as to 
whether the president of the corporation may instigate litigation 
in situations such as these. 2 Fletcher eye. Corp., Section 
618. In Elblum Holding Company vs. Mint;,l A. 2d 204 (N. 
J. 1938) the stock of a Plaintiff corporation was ••owned 
equally by two families who (were) at cross purposes with 
each other." Th.is resulted in the "impossibility of securing 
corporate sanction to bring this suit." Id. at 205. 
-
The 
president of the corporation filed suit in behalf of the 
corporation and the Defendants challenged his right to do so. 
!,g,:_ These facts are almost identical to those presented in 
the case at hand. 
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Elblum Holding Co. poi.nted out that there was authority 
on both sides of the question presented. Yet it relied upon 
the earlier precedent in New Jersey that 11 a president of a 
corporation may in pursuit of the power incidental to his 
office take the steps in defense of litigation prosecuted 
against his corporation in order to preserve the corporate 
assets." g. at 206. The Court further observed that "if 
the president were to fail to exercise the power to protect 
and defend the assets of his corporation, he might well be 
liable to his corporation for the result of losses." Id. 
at 2 a 7. 
Plaintiff-Appellant suggests that this authority further 
strengthens the holding of Kamas Securities. This courts holding 
in Kamas· Securities is valid, undistrubed precedent which 
implements the specific public policy of allowing a corporate presid~ 
to take necessary steps to protect and preserve corporate assets. 
This Court should maintain the precedent it established in 
Kamas Securities and reverse the lower Court's Judgment not 
allowing this action. Other jurisdictions confirm that this 
approach is appropriate. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above the Judgment of the lower 
court granting Defendants-Respondents' Motion to Dismiss should 
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be reversed and this case remanded to the lower Court for 
a decision on the merits. 
DATED this 
---------day of Dece'Itlber, 1981. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED 
ROMNEY, NELSON & CASSITY 
DONN E .. CASSITY 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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